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While piece rates are routinely associated with higher productivity and wages, they can also 
generate unanticipated effects. Using cross-country European data, we provide among the first 
broad survey evidence of a strong link between piece rates and workplace injury. Despite 
controls for workplace hazards, job characteristics and worker effort, piece rates workers suffer 
a 5 percentage point greater likelihood of injury. This remains despite attempts to control for 
endogeneity and heterogeneity. As piece rate wage premium estimates rarely control for injury 
likelihood, this raises the specter that part of that premium reflects a compensating wage 
differential for risk of injury. 
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 “Workmen…when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork themselves, and 
to ruin their health and constitution in a few years” (Smith, 1776, p.83). 
 
 
1  Introduction 
The notion that performance pay and piece rates, in particular, increase productivity stands well-
ingrained in the theoretical and empirical literature.  More than a dozen case studies from tree-
planting, food-processing, physician services, windshield replacement, retail firms, shoe 
manufacturing and steel production confirm that the introduction of such schemes is associated 
with increased worker productivity or that the removal of such schemes is associated with 
decreased productivity (see for instance Lazear 2000; Banker et al. 2001; Haley 2003; Jones et 
al. 2010; Gielen et al. 2010; and the cites within Frick et al. 2008).  Also well ingrained, but not 
nearly as well tested, is the idea that the increases in productivity may be offset by other worker 
behavior that hurts profitability and efficiency. Thus, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) emphasize 
that piece rates generate incentives to skimp on quality and to use excessive materials. Piece 
rates also reduce the incentive for workers to share valuable information. Moreover, frequent 
technological or product line changes can cause a “demoralized” piece rate often out of line with 
the opportunity cost of labor.  Finally, piece rates provide workers an incentive to increase their 
speed and to take greater risks increasing the probability of injuries on the job.   
We examine European survey data on this final influence identifying large and robust 
positive partial correlations between injuries and the presence of piece rate schemes.  We show 
that the risk of injury remains elevated in the presence of piece rates even when controlling for 
country fixed effects, detailed occupational and industry controls, worker controls, complex error 
structures and detailed measures of workplace hazards.  We identify a variety of specific injury 
3 
 
and health measures that are associated with piece rates and show that piece rates are associated 
with working under more pressure and at a faster pace.  We show that while this pattern exists 
for piece rates, it is not replicated for other measures of performance pay such as profit sharing 
or subjectively evaluated bonuses that are not uniquely tied to output and so generate different 
incentives. We provide a series of tests to check for heterogeneity in our estimates by country 
and industry. Finally, we attempt to correct for the possible endogeneity of piece rates yet 
continue to find higher risk of injury for those on piece rates. 
The importance of our finding is several-fold. First, the strong, robust relationship 
between injuries and piece rates suggests that the benefits to firms of increased productivity may 
be partially offset by higher costs for workers compensation / sickness insurance payments 
(increased premiums paid to public or private schemes). Second, the relationship we find 
suggests that the frequently estimated wage premium for piece rates (Pekkarinen and Riddell 
2007; Parent 1999; Seiler 1984) may be, in part, a return to greater risk of injury. In this way, 
piece rates serve as a mechanism for workers to capture compensating differentials, not simply to 
be rewarded for greater effort.
1
  Third, to the extent that there are public good rationales for the 
creation and enforcement of health and safety regulations, our findings point to piece rate jobs as 
being particularly relevant for attention.  Critically, the results do not demonstrate that workers 
paid piece rates are worse off or have lower job satisfaction, only that the injury rates appear 
higher (Green and Heywood 2008).  
In what follows, we briefly review the relationship between piece rates and injury 
emphasizing that there has been virtually no use of broad survey data to explore this relationship.  
The third section presents our data which has unusually good information on injuries, hazards 
and payment schemes.  The fourth section presents our empirical approach while the fifth section 
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establishes the robust and large relationship between piece rates and a heightened risk of 
workplace injury.  We follow this by instrumental variable estimation to account for the 
endogeneity of piece rates. A short sixth section describes both exploratory estimates of the 
relationships between earnings, piece rates and injury and the limitations within our data for 




The idea that piece rates cause injuries is as old as modern economics. Adam Smith makes clear 
that “Workmen…when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork themselves 
and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years” (Smith 1776, p.83).  In a simple agency 
model of piece rates, the principal faces a worker utility constraint from the labor market and so 
sets the earnings contract such that it just offsets effort and earnings risk costs leaving workers 
equally satisfied as without piece rates (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987; Gibbons 1998).  
Presumably in such a model, allowing for the increase in injuries associated with increased 
output or speed of production requires an even more generous piece rate to offset not only effort 
and earnings risk costs but to compensate for the greater probability of injury.  Thus, if a firm 
finds the increased output sufficient to pay such compensation, we would anticipate that the 
resulting piece rates are associated with greater output, earnings and injury risk.  
In alternative models, Lazear (1986) and Booth and Frank (1999) among others model 
piece rates as generating a self-sorting process by workers of heterogeneous abilities. The firms 
face a zero profit market constraint allowing workers with greater ability to capture the rent 
associated with their ability by sorting into performance pay.  In a similar way, those with lower 
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inherent probability of injury may also be more likely to sort into piece rates to capture the 
associated rent.
2
 At the same time, if piece rates serve as a mechanism to earn compensating 
differentials, those who sort in may be those with the least aversion to risk.
3
  Thus, these two 
types of sorting could create offsetting influences by attracting those with reduced inherent 
probability of injury but also attracting those who least mind the risk and so may take more risk.  
These two offsetting influences stand beside the pure incentive effect of a given worker to take 




Thus, we recognize that the observed probability of injury may reflect the individual 
worker specific characteristics of inherently more accident prone. This recognition mimics that 
behind the association of piece rates with productivity.  Piece rates may attract the more 
productive and also increase worker productivity regardless of inherent productivity (ability).  
The typical way to distinguish between these two complementary tendencies involves the use of 
repeated observations on individuals that allow controlling for individual fixed effects as piece 
rates are introduced (Lazear 2000).   We do not have repeated individual observations and so our 
attempt to control for endogeneity may not hold constant the individual specific component of 
being injury prone. Yet, we note that if piece rate jobs are inherently more dangerous, it seems 
unlikely the more accident prone will be attracted to these jobs suggesting that this type of 
selection may not be a serious problem.  As stressed, the less risk averse may be attracted to 
piece rate jobs and so the theoretically critical issue may be the correlation between being less 
risk averse and being inherently more accident prone upon which we have no information or 
strong priors.  
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While the exact paths of causation may well vary with the model, the suggestion by 
Adam Smith that workers facing an output based incentive will take risks with their health 
cannot be easily ruled out and seems worthy of empirical inquiry. The number of past studies 
that explore this suggestion is minimal and typically done by occupational health specialists 
focusing on narrow industries or occupations in specific locations. Thus, Sundstroem-Frisk 
(1984) studies the transition from piece rates to hourly earnings among Swedish loggers finding 
that the former was associated with significantly higher accident rates. Toupin et al. (2007) 
present evidence on heart rates from tree cutters in Canada showing that piece rates cause 
workers to dramatically increase their intensity in less difficult plots in order to make "easy 
money." The resulting heart rate data suggested "negative consequences for worker health and 
safety." A five year medical study of workers in fertilizer production in India concludes that 
piece rate workers are more vulnerable to occupational accidents (increased probability and 
severity of an accident) than otherwise similar time rate workers (Saha et al. 2004, p. 240).  The 
authors suggest a path of causation from the financial incentive to the speed of work to the 
increased accident risk. Evidence has also been presented suggesting increased risk for over-the-
road truckers in the United States paid by the mile (Williamson et al. 2009; Rodriquez et al. 
2006; Belman et al. 2005; Monaco and Williams 2000).  While the evidence is not unanimous, 
Monaco and Williams (2000) find that hourly wage drivers have significantly smaller 
probabilities of being in an accident and of violating safety standards even when controlling for 
training, demographics, firm size and type, unionization, characteristics of the vehicle and actual 
miles being driven. 
Indirect evidence on the link between piece rates and injuries can be found in the shoe 
manufacturing case study by Freeman and Kleiner (2005) who present simulations indicating 
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that piece rates are associated with much higher Worker’s Compensation costs.  Further indirect 
evidence comes from Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) who focus on a link between piece rates and 
overall health for agricultural workers. They use data from Pilipino farmers and proxy health 
with the body mass index (BMI) showing that farm workers paid piece rates have lower BMI 
values (worse health) after controlling for calorie intake, illness, lagged BMI, and other 
variables.  
Completely missing from the existing research is the use of broad individual worker 
panel surveys employed extensively by labor economists.  These sources typically do not include 
both reasonable individual measures of work related injury and specific designations of workers 
being paid piece rates. Thus, while the National Longitudinal Study of Youth and Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics allow identification of piece rate workers for some or all years, they do not 
include injury at work data.  The German Socio-Economic Panel lacks the injury data and has 
only an aggregated performance pay measure that subsumes schemes not linked to output and so 
unlikely to generate the same incentives. The British Household Panel Survey has only broad 
measures of performance pay and lacks specific information on workplace injuries. The Health, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey contains very detailed indicators on health 
status and injury but is less satisfactory at tying them to work and contains no information on 
performance pay at all. 
 
3 The European Working Conditions Survey 
We draw data from the 3rd and 4th waves of the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), 
conducted in 2000 and 2005, respectively. The EWCS is conducted by the Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, a European Union (EU) body created in 1975. 
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Each wave of the EWCS represents a new cross section survey of individual workers within 
Europe asking detailed information about the nature of their jobs and working environment. The 
initial cross section, in 1991, covered only the 15 then member EU countries. In the third wave 
workers from the 12 soon to accede countries were added. By the fourth wave this was further 
expanded to include Turkey, Norway, Croatia and Switzerland.
5
 The EWCS oversamples 
workers in small countries but contains detailed weights to adjust for the relative likelihood of 
workers appearing in the sample. All of the empirical estimates we present use these weights but 
the tenor of results does not depend upon doing so.  
The key advantage of the EWCS is that it contains detailed information on payment 
methods, injury arising from work and an extremely wide reaching set of working conditions that 
represent potentially important control variables. Specifically, we are able to observe if workers 
are paid by (i) piece rates and productivity payments; (ii) profit shares; (iii) share payments; or 
(iv) group bonuses. Thus, the piece rate variable does not include other measures of performance 
pay not linked to output that are unlikely to generate the same incentives. Yet, enough of these 
other measures exist in the survey to test the hypothesis that, indeed, piece rates are unique in the 
incentives they do generate.  Respondents report whether or not their work affects their health 
and if so how.  We take the response 'injury(ies)' as our main indicator of workplace injury. 
Respondents also provide a range of more specific details covering whether over that time work 
has caused specific physical injury and mental health conditions. In the empirical estimation we 
rely upon the former as our key dependant variable of interest, although we also demonstrate a 
pattern of response to the specific health questions that supports the role of piece rates in 
increasing the chance of certain types of injury. The information on working conditions is 
remarkably detailed covering a range of hazards associated with the working environment. These 
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include exposure to vibrations, noise, adverse temperatures, smoke/vapors, heavy lifting, 
chemicals or radiation, tobacco smoke, infectious disease, tiring positions, standing and 
repetitive tasks. As suggested, these might influence the chance of injury and may be correlated 
with the use of piece rates.  As such, their absence could represent significant omitted variable 
bias. There is also information on the nature of work tasks themselves. Previous literature 
demonstrates that piece rates are most likely to be implemented in jobs with particular task types 
such as simple and repetitive tasks that do not involve team work and are often considered 
monotonous (Parent 2002). The EWCS provides detailed information along these lines. Finally, 
a key theoretical incentive effect of piece rates is on worker effort. It is increases in effort that 
may increase workplace injury rates. Again the EWCS provides quite detailed information 
regarding working speed and effort.  




 waves of the EWCS as earlier waves do not contain 
information on workplace injuries.  We further exclude workers who are self-employed, older 
than 65 or work in the public sector. Once these observations are removed and accounting for 
non-response in key variables, we are left with 34,044 worker observations. Selected summary 
statistics are reported in Table 1.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Over thirteen percent of workers are paid piece rates. For illustrative purposes we split the 
sample statistics by workers receiving and not receiving piece rates. The workplace injury rate 
for piece rate workers is 14.4 percent, nearly double the 7.5 percent reported among non-piece 
rate workers. Piece rate workers work longer hours and are concentrated in manufacturing. There 
are essentially no differences in tenure and age. Manual workers (blue collar) have much higher 
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rates of both piece rate use and injury incidence leading us to focus in more detail on these 
workers in the results. 
 
4 Empirical Approach 
We focus on the role played by piece rates in increasingly complete specifications of the 
determinants of injury. We begin by showing that personal characteristics including tenure and 
hours play only a modest role and that piece rates retain a large marginal effect. We then narrow 
the sample by focusing on manual workers (while showing the influence for non-manual 
workers). We will then control for aspects of individual behavior which may be partially 
explained by the incentives created by piece rates.  Thus, we have indicators of workers' ability 
to choose their speed and their own self-evaluated pace of work.  We also know when they have 
worked long hours.  These are at least suggestive of the effort and speed dimensions that are 
anticipated to respond to piece rates and may also increase the risk of injury.  
We next recognize that piece rates are more likely where measurement costs are low.  As 
a consequence, we next control for task indicators such as monotony and repetition. Such 
indicators are likely be both correlated with piece rates (Parent 2002) and associated with greater 
injury risks through loss of concentration. We follow this by accounting for work place hazards. 
These will be shown to be important determinants but not to dislodge the role of piece rates.   
 Appendix Table A1 shows descriptive statistics on these important controls divided by 
the receipt of piece rates.  The workers on piece rates, which we know have a greater injury rate, 
also have jobs that are more likely to be monotonous and repetitive.  They also work longer and 
at higher speeds.  This is especially evident when they have jobs that they identify as allowing 
them to choose their own speed of work. 
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 Thus, broadly, we conceive of the determinants of injury as worker characteristics, work 
speed and effort, task characteristics, exposure to hazards and the presence of piece rates. Again, 
we recognize that piece rates may mitigate agency problems by creating incentives to work 
harder or faster.  Thus, controlling for measures of speed and effort may over-control as these 
may be the channels through which piece rates increase the risk of injury. Yet, piece rates are 
well known to more broadly generate adverse specialization (MacDonald and Marx 2001) in 
which workers perform only those aspects of the job that are best rewarded ignoring other 
aspects. Thus, a piece rate may not reward machine maintenance, the taking of work breaks, the 
visiting the infirmary for minor issues or many other job aspects that would otherwise reduce the 
risk of a reported injury.  Indeed, to the extent that a role for piece rates remains after controlling 
for speed and effort, it may reflect either our inability to fully control for effort or that this 
broader type of adverse specialization is associated with risk of injury.  
Our estimations can be expressed as variants of the following equation:
 
      ijttjijtijtijtijtijtijtijt
HazTaskEffortPayTypeWXI   0
*
        (1) 
where i, j and t index workers, countries and years.  I  is the risk of injury, X is a vector of 
personal characteristics, W is a vector of work-related characteristics including occupational and 
industry dummies, Pay Type is a vector of performance related pay schemes including piece 
rates, Task is a vector of task type indicators, Haz is a vector of workplace risk factors, ηj are 
country specific fixed effects and σt are year fixed effects. As mentioned, we will build up 
toward this full specification.  In all cases the likelihood of being injured at work is an 
unobserved latent variable Ii
* that is proxied by the dichotomous injury indicator assumed to be 
one above a threshold, k:  Ii = 1 if Ii
* >k,  Ii=0 otherwise.  We will present the marginal effects for 
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each probit estimate to allow easy comparisons of magnitudes.  Moreover, all estimates use the 
sample weights that are critical for adjusting for the over-sampling of smaller countries. 
We recognize two limitations before presenting our estimates.  First, workers who suffer 
particularly severe workplace injuries (including death) will not appear in the EWCS which only 
samples current workers. If more severe injury types are highly correlated with piece rates our 
point estimates may be biased down.  Second, in the absence of panel data, we cannot distinguish 
between incentive and sorting influences. Previous literature emphasizes the role of worker 
sorting across payment types according to risk preferences (Curme and Stefanec 2007; 
Cornellissen et al. 2011). Thus, our large positive correlations may be some combination of piece 
rates causing workers to take on new risk and workers who engage in inherently risky behavior 
being attracted to piece rates.  At the same time, workers who are inherently less likely to be 
injured will be attracted to piece rates as they can capture returns to effort and risk at lower cost. 
Thus, the potential sorting dimensions have off-setting influences of unknown size. 
 We seek to control for the potential endogeneity of piece rates by estimating individual 
injury risk while instrumenting the likelihood of receiving a piece rate simultaneously. An added 
complication is that both dependent variables are binary leading us to estimate via a recursive 
bivariate probit. Following from Heckman (1978) and Maddala (1983) there exists a reduced 
form equation for piece rates as the potentially endogenous variable and a structural form 
equation estimating the risk of injury.  Suppressing the subscripts for year and country this can 
be expressed as: 




1                                                                                            (2) 






2                                                            
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where *1iy  and 
*
2iy  are latent variables for piece rate use and injury provision with iy1  and iy2  
dichotomous variables observed according to the rule: 
 
                            0kiy  if 0
* kiy  and 1kiy  if 0
* kiy  for k = 1,2                                      (3)    
 
In (2) ix1 and iz2  are vectors of exogenous variables and the error terms ( ii 21 , ) are distributed 
bivariate normal with correlation coefficient  .  Estimates of, and inference on, the parameters 
( '1B , 1 ,
'
2 ,  ) follow directly from the maximum likelihood method and the relevant log-
likelihoods (Maddala, 1983, p. 123) with the likelihood ratio test (LR) typically providing the 
most suitable test for the exogeneity of iy1  (Monfardini and Radice 2008).  
 
                                                 0: oH   vs.  0: aH                                                        (4) 
 
However, use of the sampling weights in our estimates requires pseudo log-likelihoods with the 
Wald test routinely recommended for testing exogeneity (Korn and Graubard, 1990; Wooldridge 
2002). 
 Despite the recursive structure, Wilde (2000) demonstrates that identification can often 
be achieved by the non-linearity alone.  Nonetheless, Monfardini and Radice (2008) show that 
adding a suitable instrument to the first equation remains critical in applied work as it preserves 
the validity of the exogeneity test when the distribution of errors is non-normal as can often be 
expected. As a consequence, we follow the instrumental variable estimation of (2) by adding 
suitable controls to ix1  that do not belong in iz2 . We discuss the exact specification when we 





Table 2 presents the marginal effects from probit estimates of the determinants of workplace 
injury. Each of the performance pay indicators is included along with the basic controls for 
personal characteristics, age and gender, plus country and year fixed effects.
6
 As mentioned, the 
estimates are weighted to account for the survey design, the oversampling of workers in smaller 
countries.
7
 The first column demonstrates a sizeable and statistically significant relationship 
between piece rate receipt and the incidence of workplace injuries. Workers on piece rates were 
over 5 percentage points more likely to suffer at least one workplace injury. This is a very large 
marginal effect as the mean of the dependent variable is only 0.084. The positive and statistically 
significant relationship with piece rates is not apparent for the other performance pay types, and 
in fact profit shares are associated with a lower injury incidence perhaps reflecting the type of 
positions likely to receive profit sharing. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 The likelihood that piece rates will influence injury risk surely varies by the broad type of 
job. Commissions for sales people are far less likely to increase injuries than are production 
based pay for coal miners or factory operatives. We explore this broad conjecture by making a 
distinction between manual and non-manual occupations. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report 
estimates of workplace injury incidence split by these occupational groups. Manual workers on 
piece rates have an incidence of injury of nearly seven percentage points higher than workers 
without performance related pay. The estimate easily clears all standard tests of statistical 
significance. The corresponding figure for non-manual workers is only 1.4 percentage points, 
although this is still statistically significant at the five percent level. Interestingly, there is weak 
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evidence that group bonuses may be associated with higher rates of injury for manual workers. 
To the extent that such bonuses are related to production or speed, this might be sensible but, as 
will be shown, this relationship is never statistically significant in the subsequent estimates. In 
the remaining estimates we concentrate on manual workers. We do so because injuries are 
concentrated among manual workers and because of the expectation that it is in these 
occupations that the role of piece rates on injury should be expected. 
 The estimates in Table 2 ignore work-related characteristics that are likely to influence the 
incidence of workplace injury and may be associated with payment method. In the first column 
of Table 3 we add standard workplace controls including hours of work, tenure, four 
occupational dummies within the manual category and 11 industry dummies. These additions 
cause a slight reduction in the magnitude of the relationship between piece rates and workplace 
injuries, but it still remains sizeable (over five percentage points) and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. While the industrial classification system changed between our two waves 
forcing us to use more aggregated controls, the estimate remains significant and roughly of the 
same magnitude if we limit ourselves to the 2005 wave and include all 58 available industry 
dummies. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3  
 
In the second column we add measures of effort to the earlier specification including 
working at high speed and how many days the respondent worked more than 10 hours in the last 
month. Both increase the risk of workplace injury, and quite markedly in the case of work speed. 
However, there is very little change in the piece rate effect on work injury.   
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Work speed may not be at the discretion of the worker. While speed may be associated 
with injury regardless of discretion, the critical point about piece rates is that they are sensible 
only when such discretion exists. The EWCS contains a question asking the worker whether their 
speed of work was their choice. The last column in Table 3 introduces this as a control and also 
interacts this with speed of work. Once these controls are added, working at high speed is 
associated with an even higher risk of injury, about eight percentage points.  The variable on 
ability to choose one’s own pace also takes a positive and significant coefficient while the 
interaction takes a negative coefficient. While the pattern of coefficients is not particularly 
informative, the critical point is that including the new variables do not change the role of piece 
rates. Thus, while piece rates are associated with substantially higher injury rates, it does not 
appear that this works only through a simple decision to work faster or longer.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
In Table 4 we exploit the richness of the workplace characteristics contained in the 
EWCS. We first add controls for task types that are likely to influence the incidence of injury 
and also correlate with the use of piece rates. The first column shows that both monotonous and 
repetitive tasks take positive but not significant coefficients. Next, we include risk factors and 
hazards likely to increase the probability of workplace injury. All of the coefficients for the nine 
hazards take positive signs and six are significantly different from zero. Carrying heavy loads, 
working in tiring positions and exposure to cold and smoke all take large marginal effects. 
Despite the importance of the job hazards, the point estimate on piece rates stands essentially 
unchanged. Thus, the estimates from Table 4 suggest that the increased likelihood of workplace 
injury associated with piece rates does not flow primarily from the fact that piece rate jobs 






INSERT TABLE 5 
In Table 5 we investigate the apparent role of piece rates in two robustness checks. First, 
we estimate models separately for males and females.  These estimates, again for manual 
workers, are reported in the top panel of Table 5. The estimates reveal a larger piece rate 
coefficient for males rather than females.  In the most complete estimates males on piece rates 
emerge 6.8 percentage points more likely to be injured.  Women on piece rates are only 4.6 
percentage points more likely to be injured.  Nonetheless, the estimates are statistically 
significant for both genders. Second, we present estimates for specific forms of workplace injury.  
We examine whether or not the worker in the last year has had an injury to vision, hearing, the 
back or muscles. Using the most complete specification and again combining genders, piece 
rates take a significant positive coefficient for all four types of injury.  Importantly, the size of 
the effect of piece rates appears larger for muscular and back injuries. This would be sensible if 
the piece rate variable were highlighting a relationship with worker effort levels, rather than 
workplace hazards.  
 
5.1 Heterogeneity 
While we include a full set of country fixed effects and routinely use the sampling 
weights (which correct for the over-sampling of smaller countries), estimates across countries 
can remain problematic. The critical country-specific influence may not be a fixed shift but a 
variation in the parameter of interest, the influence of piece rates. While our sample size does not 
allow separate estimates within each country, we recognize the substantial differences in social 
regulations across the countries that could be important and influence the estimates. The two 
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primary social regulations of concern are cross-country differences in sick pay legislation and in 
workplace health and safety regulations. While more generous sick pay has been routinely 
associated with greater absence (see, for example, Neuhauser and Raphael 2004), its relationship 
with actual injury and health is far less clear. This latter relationship relies upon workers taking 
greater risks at work (engaging in moral hazard) knowing that their time away from work due to 
injury or poor health will be compensated. In their natural experiment observing exogenous 
changes in sick pay, Puhani and Sonderhof (2010) confirm the positive association between sick 
pay generosity and absence but find only modest evidence of an association with medical 
expenses and no evidence of a relationship between sick pay generosity and actual health. As a 
consequence, they conclude that more generous sick pay policy is associated with "greater 
worker absence, modestly greater utilization of health care but no influence on health."  To the 
extent that such results generalize, they suggest that cross-country differences in sick pay may 
influence absence but not the injury rate reported to researchers.   
Health and safety regulation provide the second across-country policy difference that 
may likely play a role.  More strict regulation may reduce accidents and injury but this would be 
captured in our country fixed effects. Of more concern is that more strict regulations may change 
the relationship between piece rates and injury. While the a priori direction of such a change is 
unclear, we note that Cottini and Lucifora (2010 p. 27) suggest that health and safety regulation, 
like labor market regulation more generally, follows broad patterns within Europe.  We use this 
point to divide the sample by groups of countries to test for possible heterogeneity in the 
influence of piece rates on injury.  Specifically, we estimated separate regressions analogous to 
those in the last column of Table 4 for the set of countries in the EU, the set of countries outside 
the EU, the set of larger countries (excluding Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lativa, Lituania 
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and Luxembourg), the set of Mediterranean countries, the set of non-Mediterranean countries 
and the set of Northern European countries (Scandinavia, UK, Germany and Lowlands).  While 
each of these estimates is available from the authors, they are remarkably robust. Each provides a 
statistically significant positive coefficient on piece rates in the injury equation.  Five of the six 
estimates are in the range from .045 to .060 with only that for the Mediterranean countries 
somewhat smaller at .038.  In short, we find no evidence of substantial heterogeneity by group of 
countries. 
As a further note, we have attempted to cluster errors in various fashions including by 
country and by country and year. We have no strong a priori belief about the appropriate nature 
of clustering but can report that neither of these experiments materially changed the precision of 
our piece rate estimate relative to simply using robust standard errors.  
Finally, we found somewhat more heterogeneity across industries but nothing that causes 
us to question our central results.  Again, we do not have the sample size to provide separate 
estimates within each detailed industry but can point to patterns across broad industrial groups.  
To summarize these we estimated a single regression analogous to that in the final column of 
Table 4 but which included interactions to account for seven broad industrial groups within the 
sample of manual workers. No statistically different coefficients on piece rates could be 
identified for primary industries, manufacturing, transportation or utilities/construction. In each 
of these cases, the coefficient is roughly that reported in Table 4 or slightly larger.  While these 
four groups represent the majority of piece rate workers, the three remaining industries showed 
somewhat different coefficients for the influence of piece rates. Mining returned a positive point 
estimate for piece rates more than twice as large as that indicated in the four industrial groups 
identified above but it was measured with sufficient imprecision that it was not statistically 
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different than those four.  The coefficients for both services and repairs were smaller than those 
in the four industrial groups identified above and were significantly smaller at 10 percent levels 
but not five percent level.  For all industrial groups the coefficient on piece rates remains positive 
and is significantly greater than zero in all but the last two groups.  This confirms modest 
heterogeneity by industry in roughly the way that would be anticipated.  Piece rates in services 
are likely to include sales workers, phone center workers and others for whom the risk of injury 
is simply less likely to vary dramatically because of piece rates or any other reason.  
 
5.2 Endogeneity  
We now estimate the bivariate recursive probit outlined earlier. Our identification 
strategy exploits the well-known link between the adoption of piece rates and the use of quality 
standards. Piece rates encourage workers to skimp on quality in order to increase the number of 
pieces. As a result, firms that maintain piece rate systems have a strong incentive to adopt 
stringent quality standards (Freeman and Kleiner, 2005). For example, fruit pickers are paid only 
for fruit of a certain size and color that is not bruised (Bandiera et al. 2009, p. 1055). More 
broadly, Brown (1990) argues that the fear of diminished quality implies that piece rates will 
only be used in those situations in which precise quality standards can be established and easily 
monitored.  His empirical results strongly confirm that US workers in jobs that require workers 
to meet "precise limits, tolerances or standards" are far more likely to be paid by the piece. More 
recently, Bojilov (2010) describes the common practice of US call centers that pay piece rates to 
workers who resolve claims or collect debts. Part of the practice makes the piece rate payments 
contingent on a randomly monitored share of calls meeting a quality standard based on easily 
observed phone etiquette. Thus, when quality is easily measured and precise standards easily 
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enforced, piece rates follow naturally.  Piece rates become unlikely when quality is important but 
is hard to measure, observe or enforce. Yet, these are the circumstances in which precise quality 
standards are unlikely (again, see Brown 1990). In the EWCS the following question is asked, 
“Does your main paid job involve meeting precise quality standards?” From the response to this 
we create a binary indicator that should be linked strongly with receiving piece rates.   
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
Table 6 provides estimates of the recursive bivariate probit of piece rates and injury, 
where for brevity we report only the estimates for the payment methods and the instrumental 
variable. Quality standards emerge as an important predictor of the use of piece rates as shown in 
the first column.
9
 Other performance pay methods tend to be positively associated with the use of 
piece rates while the Wald test rejects the assumption of exogeneity. Critically, piece rates retain 
a positively signed and highly significant coefficient in the estimate of workplace injury. These 
are average effects and hence difficult to interpret. We computed an Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated indicating a 23.9 percentage increase of injury for those individuals on piece rates 
who were 'treated' by the instruments. Thus, at first appearance this check suggests that the 
association between piece rates on injury is not being driven purely by endogeneity bias.  
While the relevance of the instrument does not seem at issue, its validity (the assumption 
that it is uncorrelated with injury) is difficult to assess.  While including the quality standard 
indicator in the probit estimation of injury yields a small coefficient far from statistical 
significance, there is obviously no over-identification test with only one instrument.  Moreover, 
we are unaware of any over-identification test associated with the type of weighted recursive 
bivariate probit estimated in Table 6. Thus, as a further investigation, we assume a fully 
linearized version of the estimation ignoring the dichotomous nature of both the dependant 
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variable and the instrument (see Wooldridge 2002). In order to perform an over-identification 
test, we add the two indicators of task type, repetitive actions and monotony, to the quality 
standard indicator.  Both theory and past evidence makes clear that easily defined and routine 
tasks tend to be more likely paid by the piece (Parent 2002), and we remove these from the 
injury equation as their coefficients never approached statistical significance in any of our 
previous estimations. We use of the ivreg2 command available in STATA 11 (see Baum 2006, p. 
194) so as to retain sample weights and robust standard errors. In all other ways, the specification 
mimics that in Table 6. 
Adding the additional instruments, repetitive actions and monotony, created modest 
attenuation in strength of the instruments but the F-test remained 14.74 again indicating 
relevance.  The Hansen J statistic for over-identification emerges as 1.13 (p-value of 0.56) 
failing to reject over-identification and suggesting validity. Moving this specification (with the 
three instruments) back to the recursive bivariate probit generates a virtually unchanged 
coefficient on piece rates of 1.13 that remains highly significant as shown in the second 
estimation in Table 6.  Thus, while our specification requirements do not allow the most 
straightforward of tests, we continue to find no evidence that endogeneity bias drives the 
relationship between piece rates and injury. 
Establishing relevant comparison groups provides an alternative method to focus on 
whether or not piece rates genuinely influence behavior. In particular, we identify two sets of 
workers whose jobs differ in the extent to which worker can respond to piece rate incentives.  If 
the positive correlation between piece rates and injury in the group with greater ability to 
respond exceeds that with less ability, the likelihood of a genuine influence increases.  We use 
two variables to identify workers with greater ability to respond. We take the worker to have 
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greater ability if they answer positively that they can set their own pace of work and they answer 
positively that they can organize the order of their tasks.  We then reproduce our critical estimate 
in the last column of Table 4 separately for those who answer positively to both questions 
positively and for those that do not.  The piece rate coefficient for the first group indicates 8.13 
percentage points higher risk of injury associated with piece rates while that for the second group 
indicates only 4.20 percentage points higher risk of injury associated with piece rates.  While 
each coefficient is significantly different from zero, the difference in the two estimates is also 
significantly different from zero in a fully stacked estimation.  Thus, the difference in risk of 
injury associated with piece rates is twice as large in the group with greater ability to respond to 
the incentives created by piece rates.  This difference supports our instrumental variable 
estimation in suggesting a genuine influence of piece rates on behavior.  
 
6 Implications 
 The conjecture borrowed from Adam Smith that piece rates may be uniquely associated with 
injury and illness has motivated this study. Confirming such an association is important because 
while a long string of research demonstrates that piece rates increase productivity, recent work 
has increasingly suggested a series of unintended consequences that reduce profitability. 
Increased injury risk and the resulting costs have been pointed to as one of those unintended 
consequences. To the extent that we have confirmed an association in the previous section, it is 
important not only in its own right but also because it may imply that a portion of the return to 
piece rates may represent a compensating differential.  In this section we briefly discuss evidence 
on this implication that is, admittedly, more oblique than we would like. 
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It is necessarily oblique because of the poor quality of the earnings data in the EWCS. 
They are not consistent across waves and even at its best are only provided in bands made 
somewhat problematic because of multiple currencies and costs of livings across countries.  The 
best earnings data are from the 2005 wave in which each worker reports the average monthly 
earnings from their job.  These are coded into one of ten bands harmonized across countries 
emerging roughly as deciles within country.  While imperfect, we use this relative earnings 
measure (ranging from 1 to 10) as a dependent variable in a series of log wage estimates 
summarized in Appendix Table A2.  The fundamental result from the estimates is a robust and 
large association indicating that piece rates are associated with earnings approximately .4 to .5 
higher in the ten point relative earnings measure.
10
  Thus, as best as our imperfect earnings 
measure allows, the results fit the expectation that piece rates are associated with greater 
earnings, ceteris paribus. 
It might be tempting to use the injury variable to directly test for compensating 
differentials and then determine how piece rates moderate such a test. Yet, this proves 
uninformative as the variable measures an actual injury sustained by a worker rather than the risk 
of injury associated with a worker's job or detailed occupation.  It is latter which is the typical 
variable used in the compensating differential literature (Black and Kneisser 2003).  Actual 
injuries and the associated lost work time and disabilities are well recognized to be associated 
with reduced earnings (Boden and Galizzi 2003; Crichton et al. 2005) making it impossible to 
uncover a positive compensating differential. Thus, estimating a compensating differential with 
this data is hobbled by both the very coarse earnings measure and the absence of outside 
evidence on risk of injury by the job.  Finally, it is also hampered by the absence of key 
identifying variables such as wealth and non-labor earnings critical for controlling for income 
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effects that tend to suggest that those with high incomes buy more of all on-the-job amenities 
including reduced injury risk (see Viscusi 1978). 
In the end, we cannot offer evidence on the implication that the return to piece rates may 
represent, in part, a compensating differential for increase chance of injury.  We have shown that 
our data follows the large literature confirming the return to piece rates, and we have shown that 
those piece rates are associated with a higher chance of injury.  Superior data will be required for 
a proper test of the interaction between piece rates, injuries and compensating differentials.   
 
7 Conclusion 
We have presented a wide variety of estimations using the European Working Conditions Survey 
to explore a link identified by Adam Smith.  The notion was that the incentive to produce more 
created by piece rates would cause workers to increase the risk of injury.  We show that piece 
rate workers have substantially higher risk of injury that cannot be explained by their personal 
characteristic, the available characteristics of their job or the hazards to which they are exposed.  
Moreover, the association does not appear to be driven by endogeneity of piece rates.   
 We show that the risk associated with piece rates is particularly large for manual workers 
and for men. Further results indicate that injury risk increases with hazards and with job 
characteristics such as repetition and monotony.  Yet, these controls do little to shrink the 
marginal effect of piece rates.  We show the larger marginal effects of piece rates are associated 
with muscle and back injuries, the type of injuries that might result from intensified work in 
response to the incentives.  Throughout this series of estimates, the marginal effect associated 
with piece rates is not only statistically significant but large and remarkably robust. It is typically 
in the neighborhood of 5 to 6 percent, on a manual base of 14.7 percent. Indeed, despite dozens 
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of variables and a long list of statistically significant controls the majority of the difference in 
mean injury rates associated with piece rates remains. Critically, our attempts to account for 
endogeneity do not fundamentally alter this result and our effort to divide the sample into 
relevant comparison groups suggest that the influence of piece rates is greater when workers 
have greater ability to respond to the incentives they create. 
Perhaps most intriguing has been our attempt to control for speed and effort. Our controls 
are obviously imperfect in that they may not capture all aspects of those concepts and they rely 
on subjective evaluations.  Nonetheless, they play the anticipated role as significant positive 
determinants of injury. Yet, they do not greatly diminish the importance of piece rates as an 
independent determinant of injury.  The continued strength and robustness of piece rates raises 
several possibilities.  First, while we know that those paid piece rates work faster and longer 
according to our measures, those measures may not fully pick-up the relevant dimensions of 
speed and effort.  Second, we may have done a reasonable job of picking-up those dimensions 
but piece rates create incentives along other dimensions that we cannot observed such as reduced 
breaks or reduced investment in safety and maintenance.  These tasks are likely to be unrewarded 
by piece rates and so adverse specialization moves workers away from them and toward 
production, and with production, injury. 
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TABLE 1 Selected Summary Statistics 





Piece Rates No Piece 
Rates 
        
Injury 0.084 0.041 0.147 0.144 0.075 
Piece Rate 0.133 0.092 0.191   
Profit Share 0.071 0.083 0.054 0.121 0.063 
Group Bonus 0.034 0.037 0.027 0.069 0.028 
Share Payment 0.017 0.020 0.017 0.029 0.015 
Male 0.529 0.404 0.726 0.611 0.517 
Age 38.2 38.0 38.6 38.1 38.2 
Tenure (years) 8.4 8.2 8.8 8.4 8.4 
Hours 39.0 38.0 40.7 41.0 38.7 
Agricultural  0.035 0.005 0.059 0.056 0.032 
Mining 0.007 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.006 
Manufacturing 0.252 0.141 0.430 0.368 0.234 
Retail, Trade and Repairs 0.116 0.147 0.063 0.079 0.121 
Utilities and 
Construction 
0.132 0.087 0.205 0.174 0.126 
Transport and 
Communications 
0.066 0.069 0.059 0.056 0.067 
Services 0.411 0.561 0.171 0.276 0.431 
Observations 33501 20641 12860 4361 29140 




TABLE 2  Payment Methods and Risk of Injury, Probit Marginal Effects, EWCS 2000 & 
2005. 
 
 All Manual Workers Non-Manual Workers 
Piece Rate 0.052* [0.009] 0.067* [0.017] 0.014** [0.008] 
Profit Share -0.024* [0.007] -0.014 [0.021] -0.009 [0.008] 
Group Bonus 0.019 [0.022] 0.079 [0.057] 0.007 [0.010] 
Share Payment -0.016 [0.014] 0.010 [0.044] -0.013 [0.010] 
Male 0.060* [0.004] 0.070* [0.011] 0.012** [0.005] 
Age 0.0005 [0.002] 0.001 [0.003] 0.001 [0.001] 
Age Sqr * 10 -0.0001 [0.0002] -0.0002 [0.0004] -0.00018 [0.00013] 
Pseudo r
2 
0.056 0.039 0.037 
Observations 33,501 12,860 20,641 
 
All models include country population weights and country and year fixed effects. Marginal effects are 
presented and asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses with *,** and *** indicating statistical 




TABLE 3 Payment Methods and Risk of Injury, Manual Workers, Probit Marginal Effects 
All models include country population weights and country and year fixed effects. Marginal effects are 
presented and asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses with *,** and *** indicating statistical 
















 II III  IIIb 
 + Work Characteristics Effort  Effort and Discretion 
Piece Rate 0.063*[0.017]  0.055*[0.016]  0.054* [0.016] 
Profit Share -0.014 [0.021]  -0.015 [0.021]  -0.016 [0.020] 
Group Bonus 0.068 [0.054]  0.064 [0.052]  0.059 [0.051] 
Share Payment 0.024 [0.048]  0.034 [0.051]  0.034 [0.053] 
Male 0.049*[0.013]  0.053* [0.012]  0.052* [0.012] 
Age 0.001 [0.003]  0.0001[0.003]  0.0002[0.0003] 
Age
2
*10 -0.001[0.001]  -0.0002[0.0004]  -0.0002[0.0004] 
Tenure  0.001[0.001]  0.001[0.001]  0.001 [0.001] 
Hours  0.002*[0.001]  0.0014**[0.0007]  0.002* [0.001] 
High Speed   0.056* [0.011]  0.084* [0.017] 
Work Long Hours   0.002** [0.001]   
Choose Own Work 
Rate 
    0.043* [0.014] 
Choose * High Speed     -0.038***[0.019] 
Occupational Controls      
Industry Controls      
Pseudo r
2 
0.057  0.066  0.067 




TABLE 4   Payment Methods and Workplace Hazards, Manual Workers,  
                  Probit Marginal Effects 
    III + Task Type + Work Hazards 
Piece Rate 0.052* [0.016] 0.057* [0.015] 
Profit Share -0.015  [0.021] -0.020 [0.019] 
Group Bonus 0.064 [0.052] 0.052 [0.050] 
Share Payment 0.033 [0.050] 0.042 [0.042] 
Male 0.054* [0.012] 0.030* [0.013] 
Task Type:   
Monotonous 0.013 [0.010] -0.004 [0.010] 
Repetitive Actions 0.013 [0.010] -0.002 [0.009] 
Work Hazards:    
Exposure to Vibrations  0.001 [0.002] 
Noise  0.009* [0.003] 
High Temperatures  0.002 [0.002] 
Low Temperatures  0.012* [0.003] 
Smoke/Fumes  0.013* [0.003] 
Chemicals  0.001 [0.002] 
Radiation  0.008** [0.004] 
Tiring Positions  0.012* [0.003] 
Heavy Loads  0.016* [0.003] 
Occupational Controls  
Industry Controls  
Pseudo r
2
 0.067 0.150 
Observations 12,860 12,860 
All models include country population weights and country and year fixed effects. Marginal effects are 
presented and asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses with *,** and *** indicating statistical 












TABLE 5      Piece Rates and Workplace Injury by Gender and Type of Injury, Manual Workers, 
Probit Marginal Effects. 
  II III + Workplace Hazards 
  Male Female Male Female 
Piece Rate 0.075* 0.049* 0.068* 0.046** 
 [0.020] [0.021] [0.019] [0.020] 
Pseudo r
2 
0.057 0.070 0.161 0.120 
Obs 9,331 3,454 9,331 3,454 
Types of Injury (Model III + Workplace Hazards) 
 
 Hearing Vision Back Muscle 










0.238 0.178 0.174 0.172 
Observations 12,860    
All models include country population weights and country and year fixed effects. Marginal effects are 
presented and asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses with *,** and *** indicating statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 Piece Rates and Workplace Injury, Recursive Bivariate Probit (Average Effects) 
      
  Piece Rate Injury Piece Rate Injury 
Piece Rate  1.075*  1.139* 
  [0.410]  [0.435] 


































  0.079 
[0.053] 
 





Obs 12,860  12,860  
Model includes country population weights and country and year fixed effects. All other controls are 
included as per the final column of Table 3. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses with *,** and 
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1
 See Dale-Olsen (2006) for a recent confirmation of compensating differentials for injury. 
2
 Cornellissen et al. (2010) formally model piece rate workers sorting on two dimensions. 
3
 Garen (1988) similarly emphasizes the endogeneity of injury risk arguing that those with 
largest earnings capacity will avoid the risk as safety is a normal good.   
4
 Alternative incentives schemes such as efficiency wages may also attract those with greater 
inherent productivity but remain time rates. Thus, if injury reflects effort (productivity), our 
comparison of injury on piece rates and on time rates may be an underestimate as it fails to 
control for such alternative incentive schemes. 
5
 The full list of countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, 
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland. 
6
 Education is not consistently measured across waves of the EWCS and as a result we do not use 
it as a control. In unreported but available estimates on the 2005 EWCS the inclusion of 
education did not substantively change the estimates of piece rates on workplace injury.  
7
 It is worth noting however that the sign and significance of all piece rate estimates presented in 
this paper are robust to unweighted estimation. 
8
 The large significant coefficient remained when we again limited the sample to only 2005 and 
included the full 58 industrial dummies. 
9
  Indeed, a linear probability version of the model in Table 6 yields test statistics that are above 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
10
 Similar magnitudes emerge from ordered probit estimates available from the authors. 
